Who can do what?
Six reviewed Safes. Separate signing thresholds, overlapping owners and distinct contract permissions.
The key distinctionCompound Governance has explicit role-replacement and asset-revocation powers over the reviewed treasury escrow. No direct governance revocation route was identified through the reviewed Institutional Comet governor, proxy-owner, Safe-owner and enabled-module paths. A resolution alone does not install one.
All four Admin owner addresses also sit on Upgrade, meeting its 4/7 threshold together. Three Admin owners also sit on TMC: enough for Admin’s 3/4 threshold, but not TMC’s 4/6. Overlap is not proof of common custody or cooperation.
3 / 4 OWNER AUTHORIZATIONS
Admin Safe
0x4f05f11CA5dE8946958d58AD765f16755f23b113Institutional Comet governor and Configurator governor. Reviewed core functions include pausing/unpausing market operations, withdrawing available reserves and approveThis(manager,asset,amount), which grants token allowances from Comet. Configurator authority covers market configuration, governor/pause guardian, factories, feeds, extension delegate, rates, reward speeds, collateral settings and permission checker. Stored configuration changes need deployment and an authorized proxy upgrade to take effect in Comet. This is not merely a narrow parameter role; deployed extension routes are not exhaustively audited here.
Owners and evidence
- compound-dao.eth —
0xfd947c72f09703210eeCbcab9c9206fE5e1Bb6e2 - Gauntlet —
0xFC63ef192E26E428f349057544a8786453C94f84 - Unattributed · 0660 —
0x0660db80d6e5DFD9Fe168B7967B09A09328E6bF2 - Unattributed · 671b —
0x671bcF4ff02718F2eC863930D8353b045489a00A
Admin Safe · contract state
Institutional Comet · contract state
Configurator · contract state
Comet core · reference source
Configurator · reference source
4 / 7 OWNER AUTHORIZATIONS
Upgrade Safe
0x76a07f14b53a205000d010af6cf96d4a41638629Owns CometProxyAdmin, which administers both Institutional Comet and Configurator proxies. Can authorize replacement implementations and proxy administration through that contract. An unrestricted implementation upgrade can change the market’s rules and authorities; it is broader than applying a pre-agreed configuration. All four Admin owner addresses together also satisfy this 4/7 threshold.
Owners and evidence
- WOOF —
0xd2A79F263eC55DBC7B724eCc20FC7448D4795a0C - Unattributed · 671b —
0x671bcF4ff02718F2eC863930D8353b045489a00A - Unattributed · FcFf —
0xFcFf41fe8F3BBC53562a1543c52Ec5898248800B - Gauntlet —
0xFC63ef192E26E428f349057544a8786453C94f84 - compound-dao.eth —
0xfd947c72f09703210eeCbcab9c9206fE5e1Bb6e2 - Unattributed · 0660 —
0x0660db80d6e5DFD9Fe168B7967B09A09328E6bF2 - Unattributed · 9963 —
0x9963d2f9c7E416770771d1cAF8b46ef116a2085f
Upgrade Safe · contract state
CometProxyAdmin · contract state
4 / 6 OWNER AUTHORIZATIONS
TMC Safe
0x8BacCcA3e83843555867b3865d7689D0994065674/6 Safe controls its own custody. Holds proposer/executor roles on Treasury Timelock, allowing scheduled operations subject to delay, cancellation and destination permissions. Is tmms on Treasury escrow: initiates withdrawals specifying asset, amount and recipient, and cancels pending requests. Execution after cooldown is permissionless, within the expiry window and only while unpaused. Governance can replace tmms and recover assets still in escrow; this does not recover assets already paid elsewhere. Additional strategy/streamer roles are documented but not fully refreshed.
Owners and evidence
- Victor · Platonia —
0xaA9D81Ae677baf7fb47A1B1B89661f45CD81Fb2e - compound-dao.eth —
0xfd947c72f09703210eeCbcab9c9206fE5e1Bb6e2 - allthecolors —
0x66cD62c6F8A4BB0Cd8720488BCBd1A6221B765F9 - Unattributed · f5e6 —
0xf5e68cBD19d94D5e2ddEAc8db020Cae604074444 - Gauntlet —
0xFC63ef192E26E428f349057544a8786453C94f84 - Unattributed · 0660 —
0x0660db80d6e5DFD9Fe168B7967B09A09328E6bF2
TMC Safe · contract state
Treasury Timelock · contract state
TMC transparency · deployed architecture
Treasury escrow · verified source
2 / 3 OWNER AUTHORIZATIONS
compound-dao.eth
0xfd947c72f09703210eeCbcab9c9206fE5e1Bb6e2Nested 2/3 Safe is one owner on each of Admin, Upgrade and TMC. Two of its three owner authorizations can provide that single parent-owner authorization. It cannot by itself meet any of those parent thresholds. Two owners have public identity matches (Juan / Juanbug and Abdullah Umar); 0660 remains unattributed. Its organizational mandate is unresolved; the ENS name does not make it Compound Governance.
Owners and evidence
- Unattributed · 0660 —
0x0660db80d6e5DFD9Fe168B7967B09A09328E6bF2 - Juan / Juanbug —
0xB8Dcad009E533066F12e408075E10E3a30F1f15A - Abdullah Umar —
0x3d0e30031b547737fFCf13c127350159A6C4ce17
compound-dao.eth · nested Safe
Admin Safe · contract state
Upgrade Safe · contract state
TMC Safe · contract state
undefined / 1 OWNER AUTHORIZATIONS
Avantgarde Avatar
0xeB6332bbB14b1488eFb3A395B8EBF6a6904C4241Observed 1/1 Safe owned by Treasury Timelock. Treasury Timelock-authorized transactions can exercise Safe ownership. Historical Zodiac Roles manager permissions are separate; their current state and the reported strategy deprecation have not been fully re-verified. This is a treasury example, not the Institutional Comet control structure.
Owners and evidence
- Treasury Timelock (single owner)
Avantgarde Avatar Safe · contract state
Avantgarde · governance-owned delegation proposal
TMC transparency · deployed architecture
Two identities resolved; five remain open
The June 2024 Uniswap LTIPP proposal lists Juan / Juanbug at 0xB8Dcad009E533066F12e408075E10E3a30F1f15A and Abdullah Umar at 0x3d0e30031b547737fFCf13c127350159A6C4ce17. Both addresses are owners of the nested 2/3 Safe in the 21 September reading.
Lido’s committee register corroborates Juan’s address. Abdullah’s public committee application identifies Michigan Blockchain / Arana Digital. These are public historical attributions, not fresh proof of key custody. They do not establish that Arana controls the nested Safe or any parent Safe alone.
0x0660db80d6e5DFD9Fe168B7967B09A09328E6bF2
Owner on Admin, Upgrade, TMC and the nested compound-dao.eth Safe. Public person or organization attribution was not established.0x671bcF4ff02718F2eC863930D8353b045489a00A
Owner on Admin and Upgrade. Do not assign a Foundation or security-provider seat by elimination.0xFcFf41fe8F3BBC53562a1543c52Ec5898248800B
Upgrade Safe owner. No supported public identity established.0x9963d2f9c7E416770771d1cAF8b46ef116a2085f
Upgrade Safe owner. No supported public identity established.0xf5e68cBD19d94D5e2ddEAc8db020Cae604074444
TMC owner. No supported public identity established.
Still needed: a current address-to-organization register, responsible role for each key, and the mandate of compound-dao.eth. Do not assign unknown keys to organizations by elimination.
What “controls” means here
These are identified permissions on the listed contracts, not an exhaustive inventory of every wallet, extension, strategy, module or token allowance. All Safes can normally transact with assets they hold subject to their authorization rules. This is not a full security audit.
Safe membership and main market roles: 21 September 2026. Governor, escrow, Avatar and selected treasury roles: carried forward from 19 September. Comet governor reconfirmed and source/identity review updated on 22 September. Reads were not pinned to one block. The map’s ledger records original observation dates.
Market function descriptions use reviewed core/reference source and current ABI; repository main is mutable and not a complete bytecode-matched implementation/extension audit. Escrow methods were inspected in Etherscan’s verified deployed source. Institutional pauseGuardian remains documented from deployment rather than freshly confirmed by its getter.
Historical treasury strategy permissions and WOOF streamer cancellation are described in the TMC transparency thread; current external strategy permissions and reported deprecation are not fully verified here. Assets already withdrawn cannot be recovered merely by calling escrow revoke.
Dated evidence dataset · Source and corrections